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Contents checked  
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D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date 2/7/70

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
OFFICE

DEPT.

ARABIAN

W  
414 -

FILE No. NBS 3/359/1 (Part )

TITLE: SAUDI ARABIA:

POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH IRAQ

REFER TO

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NAME  
(and dept. when necessary)

TO  
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DIVISION

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WHF

DIVISION

Mr. Hinchcliffe

Regy

ILB

DIVISION

Mr. Macdonald

ILB

Mr. Makins

Regy

ILB

DIVISION

Hinchcliffe

DIVISION

Registry Address

X Room 115,  
Downing St West.

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YEAR STAMP

1968/3

✓ AM 13-11




BRITISH EMBASSY, JEDDA.

JEDDA.

7 November, 1968.

3/40



Mr. [unclear] [unclear]  
 19/11

Dear Stirling:

Saudi Arabia/Iraq Relations

copy attached

Please refer to Baghdad's immediate telegram 385 of 2 November about the visit of the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Hardan Takriti, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdul Karim Shaikhli, to Saudi Arabia.

2. The delegation, which also included Hassan Rawi, an Ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Major General Abdul Jabbar Shanshal, Assistant Iraqi Chief of Staff, and a number of officers, arrived in Riyadh at 11 a.m. on 2 November in two Iraqi Air Force Antonovs. They were greeted by the Crown Prince, Khalid, the Minister of Defence and Acting Minister of the Interior, Amir Sultan, the Governor of Riyadh, Amir Salman, the Chief of Staff and other high-ranking officials.
3. King Faisal received the delegation that afternoon and Hardan delivered a written message to the King from the Iraqi President, Ahmad Hassan al Bakr. Afterwards, the King and Hardan held a 90 minute meeting in private. The latter told the correspondent of the Iraq News Agency that these discussions had dealt with the present need for the unity of Arab ranks to resist the existing perils threatening the Arab nation and that their views were identical.
4. Crown Prince Khalid gave a dinner in honour of the delegation attended by members of the royal family, ministers, and prominent officers and officials in the evening and on the following day the delegation performed the 'umra at Mecca and visited Medina, returning to Riyadh in the evening where they were again received by the King.
5. Sometime during the day, Hardan also had a meeting with Amir Sultan. In a statement to the Saudi Broadcasting and Television Service and to I.N.A. he described the meeting as one between Muslim brothers and Arab leaders and which had reviewed the existing Arab issues in detail. He added that "we in Iraq, the President, Government, Army and people, consider ourselves with our brothers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as one solid unit."

A. J. D. Stirling, Esq.,  
 Arabian Department,  
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL WAS DECLASSIFIED UNDER  
 SECTION 5(1) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
 ACT 1958 UNTIL 2009



In his [appropriate] comment on these remarks, Amir Sultan said "the talks between us were conducted on the grounds that General Takriti was the representative of both the Iraq army and the Saudi army at the same time. This man, who works faithfully for the sake of Arabness and Islam, has always been regarded by us as a representative of the Saudi and Iraqi armed forces."

6. The delegation left for Kuwait at 10 a.m. on 4 November, but crowded two more items into their programme on the morning of their departure. Takriti and the officers in the delegation visited the military base at al Kharj accompanied by the Amirs Khalid, Sultan and Salman, and the Saudi Chief of Staff. During this visit, Shaikhli had talks with the King's special adviser, Amir Nawwaf, and Dr. Rashad Pharaon, and the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Shaikh Omar Saqqaf.

7. In a final statement to the Press, Takriti said that the King and Saudi officials with whom the Iraqis had held talks were fully aware of all the Arab issues. He added that the attitude of Saudi Arabia towards handling existing questions in a way guaranteeing the rights of the Arabs in all parts of the Arab homeland were similar to that of Iraq. He promised to visit Saudi Arabia whenever necessary to discuss developments and invited Crown Prince Khalid and Amir Sultan to visit Iraq. The delegation were seen off in similar style to that in which they had been received and on their arrival in Kuwait, Takriti is reported as having said that his visit to Saudi Arabia was successful and that the talks he held were very useful.

8. At lunch yesterday the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires, Sayid Fakhruddin Tahir, told me that he thought the visit had been a successful one. Everyone had been expecting the delegation to raise the subject of the Gulf, but apart from an assurance to the Saudis that their only interest in the U.A.E. was that it should go ahead without interference and it was not their intention to become involved at this stage [borne out, perhaps, by the fact that our friend Mahmud Daud was not in the delegation]. The subject was not otherwise raised. Nor was any mention made of the Kurds in any of the official discussions. He did not know what had been discussed by Takriti in his private audience with the King. The unified command had been discussed at committee level and the Saudis were giving it favourable consideration, [our Defence Attaché, Colin Fitzpatrick, confirms that the Saudi Ministry of Defence were preoccupied with discussions with the Iraqi officers during the visit]. I asked if the delegation had requested any aid and he said that the Saudis had said they were prepared to help in any way. When I remarked that the visit



had been a promising one, he agreed and added "but you know what promises are".

9. Fakhruddin then said that Hardan had been popularly received, but that he thought that Shaikhli had made a good impression on the Saudis. He had been surprised to find that this unknown young lawyer had such a complete grasp of the history of Palestine and "a Wilsonian capacity for quotation." He had also shown a remarkable knowledge of the comparative performances of the Phantom, Mig 21 and the Lightning. He added that it was Iraqi concern at the possible supply of Phantoms to Israel and the likely failure of the Jarring mission which had stirred the Iraqis into making this visit. They were worried by the Middle East situation, particularly the potential direct threat to Iraq if the Israelis were supplied with Phantoms. However, they had said that they welcomed the recent British, Canadian, French resolution in the General Assembly, about the Middle East situation, and this had been endorsed by the King.

10. Fakhruddin also said he had never known the King to be "so nervous" about Communism. He held forth at length about American policy in the Middle East, to which he attributed the present Communist threat. Shaikhli, who had left the U.N. before Omar Saqqaf, had asked the latter if there had been any new developments in American attitudes towards the Middle East. Saqqaf had said he had discovered nothing new, either at the U.N. or in his discussions with Dean Rusk.

11. On Iraq itself, Fakhruddin said that the President, Ahmad Hassan, was playing a very wise game and that Hardan was probably in control of the situation. He mentioned that Salih Mahdi had been sent to Cairo and Algeria rather than let him loose on "conservative" countries.

12. Saudi attitudes towards the visit were warm if not enthusiastic. The press and television gave it prominent coverage and the visitors were well received and looked after.

13. During my trip to Riyadh today, I also picked up one or two other points of interest about the visit. In reply to my question, Dr. Rashad Pharaon said the visit had gone quite well. They liked Hardan, "but you know the Iraqis". Ahmad Abdul Wahab, the Chief of Royal Protocol, said that he "did not like Hardan's face" nor did he take to Shaikhli. Kamal Adham told me that Hardan had done well. The private session with the King had been deliberately arranged to probe the Iraqi position. Because of the division in the present Ba'ath Government, their feeling was that Hardan was

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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN CLOSED UNDER  
SECTION 5 OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS  
ACT 1983 UNTIL 2009



the mainstay against worse things to come and that he should know that the Saudis recognise this. The Saudis wanted to test Iraqi attitudes not so much to Arab problems as to other Arab states. Hardan had assured the King that he and Ahmad Hassan had the situation in Iraq under control. Whilst Iraq would maintain their links with the extremist countries and pay verbal homage to the revolutionary line, the policy would be to support the moderate countries in deed. Iraq would support the Saudi line in the Gulf. The Kurdish situation was only mentioned in passing - that a settlement was being sought - but Hardan said that the Government were on good terms with the Shah.

14. I am sending copies of this letter to Chanceries at Baghdad, Bahrain Residency, Cairo, Kuwait, Tehran, Washington and U.K.M.I.S. New York.

*Yours ever,*

*H. St. J. B. Armitage*

(H. St. J. B. Armitage)

**PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE**

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Piece. .... 1178 .....

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Folio 1 Enclosure.

**and closed until .... 20~~09~~ .....**

Chapman 22.10.99

NEQ 2/2

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CYPHER/CAT.A.

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD  
TELEGRAM NO. 385

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
2 NOVEMBER 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING RECEIVED BAGHDAD.

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELEGRAM NO. 385 OF 2 NOVEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS  
NEW YORK AND CAIRO

MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM.

THE SUBJECTS LIKELY TO BE RAISED BY TIKRITI AND SHAIKHLY DURING  
THEIR VISITS ARE

(A) SAUDI ARABIAN AND KUWAITI SUPPORT IN MAKING REPRESENTATIONS  
TO SHAH ON THE KURDISH PROBLEM. (SHAH IS REPORTED TO BE VISITING  
SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT DURING WEEK BEGINNING 9 NOVEMBER).

(B) POSSIBLE LOANS. THE BAATH OBTAINED A £30 MILLION LOAN FROM  
KUWAIT IN 1963.

(C) GIVEN IRAQI INTEREST IN THE PURCHASE OF LIGHTNINGS AND  
DELAY IN DELIVERY DATE, POSSIBILITY OF A QUOTE SWITCH UNQUOTE  
TO IRAQ OF PLANES ALREADY ORDERED BY SAUDI ARABIA OR KUWAIT OR  
BOTH.

(D) THE GULF AND IN PARTICULAR IRANIAN POLICY AND ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE U.A.E.

2. THE TOUR IS CLEARLY PART OF NEW REGIMES EFFORT TO PUT IRAQ  
ON MAP OR TO ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT. MINISTER OF FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS RECENTLY VISITED PRAGUE WARSAW AND PARIS ON HIS WAY TO  
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO JEDDA KUWAIT BAHRAIN AND ROUTINE  
TO TEHRAN WASHINGTON UKMIS NEW YORK AND CAIRO

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION  
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- 4 FEB 1969

Cutting dated ..... 19

152


# IRAQ HANGINGS SUPPORTED BY SAUDI ARABIA

By Our Staff Correspondent  
in Beirut

Baghdad Radio yesterday claimed that Mr. Omar Saqqaf, Saudi Arabian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has supported Iraqi action last week in publicly hanging 14 people, including nine Jews, who were alleged to have spied for Israel and the United States.

The radio said that before leaving Baghdad after a two-day visit, Mr. Saqqaf said: "No one was entitled to defend those traitor criminals."

His visit has given rise to speculation that he might be interceding on behalf of King Feisal of Saudi Arabia for a more moderate attitude towards political prisoners now awaiting trial in Baghdad.



why?

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4/8

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
3



BRITISH EMBASSY,

JEDDA.

18 September, 1969.



Dear Sir,

Saudi Arabia - Iraq

The Iraqi Minister of Education, Dr. Ahmad Abdul Sattar Jawari, visited Saudi Arabia from 12 to 16 September accompanied by Ja'afar Katib Hamudi, a "special counsellor" at the Presidential Palace. They were received by the King in Taif on 13 September.

2. The only information we have had about the purpose of Janari's visit is from Bill Stoltzfus. He was told by Omar Saqqaf that the Iraqis informed the King that at the forthcoming meeting of Arab Defence Ministers in November, Iraq would demand more money from Saudi Arabia in support of the Palestine cause.

Yours ever,

*John Armitage*

(H. St. J. B. Armitage)

W. H. Fullerton, Esq.,  
Arabian Department,  
F.C.O.,  
London, S.W.1.

c.c. Chancery, Baghdad.

CONFIDENTIAL

(4)

RECEIVED IN <del>RECEIVED IN</del> RECEIVED No. 6 26 NOV 1969
NBS 3/359/1

AF/301/69/84c (AIR)

(R.I. 42)

Copy to: F. & C.O. (Arabian Department) } less map  
R.A.F. Sy. 1b

We should be grateful if you would consider the copy letter and map attached, and give us the material for a reply to Building Surveys, Ltd. As you know, the firm is a reputable one, concerned at the moment with the safety of a crew and an aircraft, and the Department should help if possible.

2. When you reply, we shall ask R.A.F. Sy. 1b to say whether the material may be released to the firm. It will help if you can keep the level to Restricted, unless by doing so you would be forced to conceal a vital factor.

3. Please return the map to us.

*Mr. Mackay Answer 24/XI. (No doubt him 21), in line Dugger rec has  
Mr. Mafinson NED to see (don't pass for line. NED in personally  
minute. (Lover is?) Answer  
over son.*

*[Signature]*

*21/11*

(M. ASHLEY)  
84c (AIR)  
Room 712, Ext. RM 3618  
Northumberland House  
21st November, 1969



# HUNTING SURVEYS LIMITED

A DIVISION OF HUNTING SURVEYS AND CONSULTANTS LIMITED  
6 ELSTREE WAY - BOREHAM WOOD - HERTS - ENGLAND  
Cables: ASTEREO BOREHAMWOOD Telephone: 01-953 6161 Telex: 23517

Directors  
T. D. WEATHERHEAD, OBE, MA Managing  
P. G. MOTT, BA, MICE, FRICS General Manager  
O. M. ADAMS Marketing  
O. S. HIGHCOCK Secretary

AIR PHOTOGRAPHY - LAND SURVEY - PHOTOGRAMMETRY - MODELS

Our Ref: JLC/WAG

14th November, 1969

Ministry of Defence,  
S.F.4 C (Air),  
Northumberland House,  
Northumberland Avenue,  
London, W.C.2.

Dear Sirs,

## Saudi Arabia


We have been awarded a contract to carry out high level aerial photography over a large area of northern Hijaz in North Western Saudi Arabia. A map showing the area concerned is attached.

It is proposed to commence this survey at the beginning of January 1970 and it is expected to take approximately 8 weeks.

The operating height will be 25,000 feet above mean sea level and the photo runs will be flown in a east west direction. The aircraft will be based at Tabuk.

We feel that there may be some risk in operating at this height near the Israeli and Iraqi boundaries and would appreciate your advice on the minimum safe distance we can approach these areas.

Yours faithfully,  
for HUNTING SURVEYS LIMITED

  
J.L. Cowtan  
Projects Manager


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not  
enclosed  
a map of  
the area  
Jye

Restricted

Reference.....

(5)



h<sup>r</sup> Fullerton

The Iraqis have shown themselves extremely touchy, & there is a risk of an incident.

Is not this something HMA Jeddah should ask the Saudis to speak to the Iraqis about, perhaps jointly with HMA Baghdad?

Fullerton  
25.11.69

I telephoned Mr Gelling of S4c (air) and arranged to speak again when we receive RAF S41b's reply. I pointed out the contents of Mr Robinson and Mr Macne.

Pro J  
29/11


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8/12  
25/11

Covering

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~~Lease Minute~~

6



AF/301/69/84e (AIP)

~~R.I.4b~~

Copy to: D.I.4b  
RAF Sy.1b  
F.C.O. (Arabian Department) ✓

Hunting Surveys, Ltd. - Operation in Saudi Arabia

We spoke Haywood/Cutting about this request. As arranged, we now enclose for your action:-

- a. letter JLC/WAS dated 14th November, 1969 from Hunting Surveys, Ltd., which we have acknowledged and very briefly discussed with the firm.
- b. our lease minute to D.I.4 dated 21st November, 1969
- c. DI4e/T304/IAF dated 25th November, 1969, in reply.
2. Mr. W.H. Pullerton of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Main A, extension 305) is interested in this project. We are sending him a copy of D.I.4b's lease minute, and believe that he may be able to help via diplomatic channels. It might be useful to hold a meeting with the firm.
3. We assume that D.I.4b still have the map which we sent them.

auto →  
Pa -  
Z  
di

(L.J. CUTTING)  
84e (AIP)  
Room 712, Ext. XN 5618  
Northumberland House  
26th November, 1969

Covering

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
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DI.4c/TS.04/IAF

S.4c(Air)

HUNTING SURVEY OF SAUDI-ARABIA

1. Reference your Loose Minute AF/301/69/S.4c(Air) of 21st November, 1969.
2. We have little doubt that the planned flights would be detected by Israeli and probably by Iraqi radars and that as a result an interest is likely to be shown by the air forces of both countries. This interest could well involve the interception and identification of the Hunting Survey aircraft and as such could take place within Saudi-Arabian airspace opposite the Iraqi frontier and especially the area facing Israeli occupied SINAI between Sharm El Shaykh and Eilat/Aqaba. The likely depth of such interception attempts is not known - but distances up to 20 n.m. would not be out of the question. It should also be borne in mind that the Israeli Air Force fly at will over Jordan.
3. We would feel it advisable that some arrangement should be made whereby either the Saudi-Arabian or British authorities make both the Iraqis and the Israelis aware of the intended flight programme, or that part of it which nears the frontiers of those countries.
4. We feel that this information may be drawn upon at RESTRICTED level, but the overall contents of this Minute should be CONFIDENTIAL.



(P.C. MELLETT)  
Squadron Leader  
DI.4b

25 November, 1969.

M.O. 2326

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Macrae  
Mr Hinchcliffe

27/11


Mr Macrae has commented.

# Hunting Survey of Saudi Arabia

Please see the paper at Flag I.

Para.2. We could, subject to the agreement of the posts concerned of course, presumably urge the Saudis to speak to their brother Arab Iraqis. We could speak directly to the Iraqis and Israelis ourselves.

I should be grateful for your views on the probable effectiveness of such approaches.




(W.H. Fullerton).  
Arabian Department.  
27/11/69.

I think it would be possible to make an approach to the Israelis via our air attaché in Tel Aviv, or normal civil air channels.

27/11


I have told Sec (Ar) that we are prepared to make approaches. They will now tell the firm that we think approaches are advisable, first of course to the Saudis, and that we will need to have proposed dates and routes etc. Sec (Ar) will contact us when they have spoken to the Company.

28/11



CONFIDENTIAL

(8)



BRITISH EMBASSY,

JEDDA.

(3/40)

I have briefly  
acknowledged 25 November, 1969.  
JMS 27/X

Dear Acland,

Saudi Arabia - Iraqi Exiles

M. Makin 25/11  
Enter  
M. Hinchcliffe  
JMS 27/X  
2/12

During a visit to Riyadh on 22/23 November, I met Salih Kubba, the former Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq. I did not know of his fall from grace and, when I heard from him the story of his escape, I was surprised that this outwardly timid person had come through such an ordeal, apparently unscathed. He looked far healthier than I can ever remember him and was in very good spirits.

2. Salih told me that after his resignation in February in favour of Abdul Hassan Zalzal, he was watching television one night with a friend when the Rashid Muslih "confession" was broadcast. He was surprised that Rashid, whom he hardly knew, as an apparent afterthought just before the close of the interview, named him and mentioned his association with Lutfi Obaidi. Salih said that he hardly knew Rashid whom he had met very rarely as a Minister, but, of course he knew Lutfi as a co-director of the United Bank of Iraq (Intra's Iraqi associate). His friends had advised him not to go home and he went to the house of another friend. Salih's family were also warned and left their house that night and went to the house of a nephew. During the night the Ba'ath visited his home and the houses of his nephews and relatives saying they wanted to see him "to sign some papers". After two or three days he took refuge in a house belonging to his nephew opposite his own house in Sa'adun Park /this would be almost next door to the I.P.C. representative's old residence, which Sir Humphrey Trevelyan once occupied. He had lived there for five months. His nephew visited the house every day for lunch as was his custom and was able to pass Salih food and messages.

3. Apparently, the Ba'ath made no open effort to search for him after the first night. Towards the end of October, Salih had moved to Najaf. There were four road blocks on the way, but these were manned by Army who showed no sign of interest, merely waving his car through. Had there been a member of the party present, the inspection might have

/less

A. A. Acland, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pa MB  
for



- 2 -

less perfunctory. He had grown a larger moustache and wore dark glasses and an ordinary western suit - if he had been caught in Arab dress this would have been taken as disguise and indicated a guilt which he did not have. A nephew had provided him with a factory identity card, from a family concern near Hilla, made out in the name of Salih Abdul Amir, which was after all, his correct name. After a day or two in Najaf, he had travelled by lorry across the desert to al Ar'ar. The Iraqi frontier post had caused no trouble and the Saudis had looked after him well, even though both the Commander and his deputy were away. He had sent messages to King Faisal and Shaikh Zaki Yamani whom he knew quite well, and after eleven days he had received an entry permit valid for three months. Since his arrival in Riyadh ten days ago he had been living in the Yamamah Hotel in a room next to Yamani's suite. However, the hotel is expensive and he is looking for other accommodation. He spoke highly of the courtesies and attention afforded him by the Saudis.

4. Salih said that he might visit Abu Dhabi in a month or two just to see his son, Muhammed, who is working there at the National Bank. He asked if the Embassy could give him a visa and I explained the procedure. He said that his passport issued this year was still valid until January, 1971. He would not come to Jedda as he did not wish to meet the Iraqi Embassy - even though he had been on good terms with the Ambassador, Nu'aimi, who had been at school and university with him. He added that he had been on good terms with Ahmad Hassan Bakr and his latest news was that no action was likely to be taken against him. Nevertheless, he had felt it better to be safe than sorry.

5. The next afternoon when returning to the hotel with one of the Consortium, I was greeted by Mahmud al Durra, the old revolutionary supporter of Rashid Ali and, once, the most ardent of Nasserites. Mahmud came to Saudi Arabia from Beirut nearly three months ago. He was in Jedda for six weeks, where he was in contact with the Iraq Embassy, and the rest of the time he has been sitting in Riyadh. I hear that he has now "discovered" that Nasser is the enemy of the Arabs and voices this revelation on every occasion, much to the amusement of his fellow Iraqi exiles who say they have been telling him this for years. He told me that he had just received a letter from his wife warning him not to come near Kuwait or the Lebanon as he ~~will~~ be assassinated or abducted by "his enemies".

/(This



- 3 -

(This might have been his embroidering of his own fears caused by the reported kidnapping of Ata Abdul Wahab from Kuwait.) He is rich enough to look after himself and I doubt that the Saudis will give him anything but the right of refuge - a physical and mental security which many beside the Ba'ath will consider, he hardly deserves to enjoy.

6. I also heard from Mahmud Baban, the Kurdish ex-Minister in Hashimite Iraq, that two weeks before Salih arrived at al Ar'ar, he was preceded by Mahdi, the son of Ayatullah Muhsin Hakim. He also sat in al Ar'ar for nearly a fortnight, but was finally refused entry into Saudi Arabia, and went off to Amman where he stayed briefly with the Lebanese Ambassador, Ali Bazzi, his uncle. He is now living with his mother's family in the South Lebanon.

*He is a  
Shi'ah.*

7. Another arrival in Saudi Arabia is Ahmad, the young son of the late Abdussalam Arif, who is now attending the Yamamah School "to get a good religious education". I was told by Mahmud Baban that he was brought to Iraq by a Moslawi member of the ikhwan al muslimin. He was placed in the school through the good offices of another Iraqi, Muhammed Sawwaf, also a member of the ikhwan, who has some responsibility for Islamic education in the Ministry of Education. When I commented that I found it strange that the Saudis would help the ikhwan, Mahmud said that there was no question but the Saudis subverted the ikhwan through one Said Ramadan in Geneva (this is a new name to me and I did not have the opportunity to delve deeper).

*His mother  
is in London*

*Yours ever,  
H. St. J. B. Armitage*

(H. St. J. B. Armitage)

c.c.s. Chancery, BAGHDAD.  
Chancery, AMMAN.  
Chancery, BEIRUT.  
Chancery, CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

Asian.  
Near Eastern Department,

(9)

27 November, 1969.

+3/40+

SS 3/359/1

Saudi Arabia - Iraqi Exiles

Many thanks for your letter 3/40 of 25 November. We have read this round up on the fate of some Iraqis with great interest.

(A. A. Aeland)

H. St. J. B. Armitage, Esq.,  
Jedda.

CONFIDENTIAL

Pa MB  
for

Mr. Fullerton.

I met two representatives of Hunting Surveys Ltd at MOD this afternoon.

2. For their aerial photography and land contour survey they need to overfly the (i) Saudi/Iraqi (ii) Saudi/Jordanian (iii) Saudi/~~Basra~~ Gulf of Aqaba borders in order to turn and go back into Saudi airspace without distorting their photographs.

3. The trickiest area is the Gulf of Aqaba where both Israeli and Egyptian radar will pick them up (the Israeli about 20 miles inside Saudi Arabia). In addition the Israelis will not welcome the chance of their Sinai airfields being photographed by a company working for Saudi Arabia.

4. I suggested that they should ask the Saudis to arrange with the Iraqis (and the Jordanians for courtesy's sake) that the DC3 survey aeroplane should be permitted to overfly the borders without interception, and, if the Saudis agree to H.M.G. being told the details of the survey, to explain that the British govt. (subject to HMA Tedda's approval) would approach

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12 DEC 1969

NBS3/354/1

Draft tel. to  
Tedda attached  
9/12/69.

the Israelis on behalf of Hunting Surveys. Hunting's representatives agreed to this proposal, particularly after I hinted that if there were to be a bagasse, it would be better for the squabble to be between the Saudi and Iraqi govts than between a British Co. and the Iraqi Govt.

5. The arrangement now is that Hunting Survey will approach the Saudis and will let us know when they wish us to speak to the Israelis. I made the point that, if they get the agreement of the Israelis to overfly the Gulf of Aqaba, they are not likely to be molested by anyone else. Huntings said they would be pleased to give Israeli stations regular position reports, if that would help.

6. As a tail piece I mentioned the squabble on the Saudi / Yemeni border and emphasized that Huntings must make sure that their operation is known to the Saudi military net in that area.

J. L. Blackley.  
J. L. Blackley

we spoke. 5 December.

See f.s. ~~but~~ This reached me on 15 Dec, after the letter

had gone. I think it  
might be safer if  
the information were passed  
informally by embassies  
(i.e. A/A) rather than  
the Company.

As we see drafts before  
despatch please?

Shelington

NEO

15.12.69

Arabian Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

(LAST PAPER) 11 December, 1969

Dear Craig,

Hunting Survey of Northern Saudi Arabia

Hunting Surveys Ltd. have apparently been awarded a contract to carry out a high level aerial photographic survey of the Northern Hejaz and an area of the North of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the borders of Jordan and Iraq. To achieve good pictures of the border areas the survey aircraft (a D.C.3) would need to overfly the Saudi/Jordanian and Saudi/Iraqi frontiers to a depth of about two miles. It would also need to fly some four miles out over the Gulf of Akaba.

2. In view of the obvious possible danger to the aircraft in the border areas, and particularly the Gulf of Akaba, Hunting Surveys asked us and the MOD whether we thought it would be safe for them to attempt the work.

3. We agreed that there could be considerable danger and suggested, at a joint meeting with the Company and the MOD, that Hunting Surveys should explain their anxiety to the Saudis and ask them to speak to the Iraqis and Jordanians about the survey. We told the Company that they could tell the Saudis that we would, in principle, be prepared to approach the Israelis if the Saudi Government so wished and would furnish us with the necessary information to pass on. We pointed out to the Company that an approach to the Israelis would be extremely important and left them in no doubt of the risks they would run if the Israelis were not warned and did not agree to lay off.

4. However, given that the Israelis, Iraqis and Jordanians are all briefed in due course and agree not to molest the survey aircraft, the chances of an accident are still presumably fairly high. The survey is due to start on 1 January, but I imagine it is very unlikely that all the necessary approaches could be made between now and then, so even if all goes well it will probably be delayed. Meanwhile you may be approached by Hunting Surveys for advice and assistance.

Yours ever,

J. L. Blackley

A.P. (W.H. Fullerton)

Copied to:  
Hon. Ldr. P.C. Mallett  
OD (DI 4b)  
J. Cutting Esq.  
OD, 54C (Air),  
Room 712, Northumberland House.

(LAST PAPER)

Craig Esq.,  
Adda.

CONFIDENTIAL

*Handwritten notes:*  
1 1/2 done.  
at 5pm  
done  
by 10pm  
Tel. advice  
page 2a/1  
done per

*Confidential*  
RESTRICTED

(Letter)

A.J.M. Craig Esq.,  
British Embassy,  
Jedda.

from W.H. Fullerton

Hunting Survey of Northern Saudi  
Arabia

*LLd.*

Hunting Surveys have apparently been awarded a contract to carry out a high level aerial photographic survey of the Northern Hejaz and an area of the North of Saudi Arabia adjacent to the borders of Jordan and Iraq. To achieve good pictures of the border areas the survey aircraft (a D.C.3) would need to overfly the Saudi/Jordanian and Saudi/Iraqi frontiers to a depth of about two miles. It would also need to fly some four miles out over the Gulf of Akaba.

2. In view of the obvious possible danger to the aircraft in the border areas, and particularly the Gulf of Akaba, Hunting Surveys asked us and the M.O.D. whether we thought it would be safe for them to attempt the work.

3. We agreed that there could be considerable danger and suggested, at a joint meeting with the Company and the M.O.D., that Hunting Surveys should explain their anxiety to the Saudis and ask them to speak to the Iraqis and Jordanians about the survey. We told the Company that they could tell the Saudis that we would, in principle, be prepared to approach the Israelis if the Saudi Government so wished and would furnish us with the necessary information to pass on. We pointed out to the Company that an approach to the Israelis

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*J.L.B.*

*Please see this change and sign - my advice you might think before you go. 10/12.*

*cc.*

*Squad Leader  
P.C. Mallett  
DI 4 b. mod*

*L.T. Curting  
S4C (Aiv)  
Room 712  
Northumbria  
Hull  
mod.*

would be extremely important and left them in no doubt of the risks they would run if the Israelis were not warned and did not agree to lay off.

4. However, <sup>given that</sup> ~~even if~~ the Israelis, Iraqis and Jordanians are all briefed in due course and agree not to molest the survey aircraft, the chances of an accident are still presumably fairly high. The survey is due to start on 1 January, but I imagine it is very unlikely that ~~the~~

~~Stadis will have digested the problem, and taken action themselves, and agreed to an approach to the Israelis by then even if they agree in principle, so it may well be delayed. Meanwhile you may be approached by Hunting Surveys for advice and assistance.~~

~~by us~~

*Refer.*

all the necessary approaches could be made between now and then, so even if all goes well, it will probably be delayed. Meanwhile you may be approached by Hunting Surveys for advice and assistance.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Saudi Arabia: Political Relations With Iraq. Relations With Iraq. 7 Nov. 1968. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/1178. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107471560/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=4c5d0acd&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107471560/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=4c5d0acd&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.